Agent Data Injection Attacks are Realistic Threats to AI Agents

Woohyuk Choi*
Seoul National University
00cwooh@snu.ac.kr

Juhee Kim*
Seoul National University
kimjuhi96@snu.ac.kr

Taehyun Kang
Seoul National University
gangtaeng_parangvo@snu.ac.kr

Jihyeon Jeong
Largosoft
stellaris08@proton.me

Luyi Xing
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
lxing2@illinois.edu

Byoungyoung Lee
Seoul National University
byoungyoung@snu.ac.kr

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***Abstract*—AI agents act on behalf of user prompts, consuming external data and taking actions based on the agent context. Prior research on AI agent security has primarily focused on indirect prompt injection (IPI). Its most well-studied category is instruction injection, where attacker-controlled untrusted data is interpreted as an instruction. In response, many mitigations have been proposed to prevent instruction injection attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new category of IPI, agent data injection attacks (ADI). ADI injects malicious data disguised as trusted data, such as security-critical metadata (*e.g.*, resource identifiers or data origins) or agent context data (*e.g.*, tool call and response formats). As a result, agents unknowingly execute unintended actions based on attacker-controlled data. ADI has similar attack impacts as instruction injection attacks, because it causes agents to misbehave and execute unintended actions. Despite the similar impact, ADI remains underexplored and easily bypasses existing IPI defenses. We found several critical vulnerabilities in real-world agents that allow an attacker to launch various attacks: arbitrary click attacks on web agents (Claude in Chrome, Antigravity, and Nanobrowser), and remote code execution and supply-chain attacks on coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, and Gemini CLI). We evaluate ADI vulnerabilities across off-the-shelf models and AI agents, and find that ADI is effective in both standalone LLMs and AI agent settings. ADI exposes a critical gap in agent security, signifying that current AI agents do not employ a fundamental security principle: current agents do not isolate trusted data from untrusted data.**

1. Introduction

AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) by connecting them with tools that interact with external environments. AI agents are rapidly being adopted in real-world workflows, such as reading emails, browsing the web, and executing code [1–3]. In these workflows, AI agents often process data from various external sources, which may include both trusted (e.g., the author of a comment) and attacker-controlled data (e.g., the content of a comment). As mixing trusted and untrusted data has historically led to security vulnerabilities in traditional systems [4, 5], it is important to understand how AI agents handle such data.

Prior research on AI agent security has primarily focused on indirect prompt injection (IPI) [6–8]. Its most well-studied category is instruction injection, where attacker-controlled data is misinterpreted as an instruction. In response, defenses such as model hardening [9, 10], input guardrails [11, 12], and dual-LLM [13, 14] have been proposed. While the technical details vary, the core idea behind these defenses is to separate instructions from agent data, thereby preventing attacker-controlled data from influencing the agent's behavior.

This paper introduces ADI, a new category of IPI that exploits a different vulnerability, the lack of isolation between trusted and untrusted data. Unlike instruction injection, which causes untrusted data to be misinterpreted as an instruction, ADI causes untrusted data to be misinterpreted as trusted data. This has critical security implications because trusted data often includes security-sensitive metadata such as the author name of a comment, the security identifier of a Web UI element, or the history of tool executions.

To induce untrusted data to be misinterpreted as trusted data, ADI develops a core attack technique called probabilistic delimiter injection. By injecting delimiters of the data format (e.g., `{}` for JSON) into untrusted fields, attackers corrupt the LLM's interpretation of data structure, causing it to perceive attacker-controlled values as trusted metadata. While classic injection attacks such as SQL injection and XSS also inject delimiters [4, 5], they succeed only when the injected delimiter exactly matches the format's valid syntax, as they target deterministic parsers. In contrast, the LLM interprets data probabilistically, so even inexact delimiters (*e.g.*, escaped characters) are probabilistically misinterpreted as structural delimiters.

We demonstrate ADI through three attacks against various real-world agents [2, 3, 15–18]. The first attack is an arbitrary click attack against web agents (Claude in Chrome, Antigravity, Nanobrowser) [2, 17, 18], where a fake UI element causes the agent to click attacker-specified elements, effectively making any website with user-generated content

*. Equal contribution

vulnerable to XSS-like attacks. The second is a remote code execution attack against coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI) [3, 15, 16], where an attacker posts a GitHub issue comment that spoofs the author as a maintainer, tricking the agent into executing malicious commands. Third, a supply chain attack occurs when a malicious pull request tricks the agent into merging it without reviewing the actual code by injecting a fake tool response.

Our evaluation shows that off-the-shelf LLMs are highly vulnerable to probabilistic delimiter injection, with attack success rates (ASR) of 31.3%–43.3% on JSON and 33.3%–100.0% on web DOM data across six models. Moreover, most existing IPI defenses fail to address ADI. While instruction injection achieved near-zero ASR (0.0%–0.7%) against state-of-the-art agent defenses, ADI achieved up to 50.0% ASR.

Existing IPI defenses fail against ADI because they focus on enforcing a coarse-grained trust boundary between instructions and agent data to prevent instruction injection. However, ADI demonstrates that security-critical boundaries exist within agent data itself, which should be properly isolated. This finding suggests that future agent defenses should adopt a more fine-grained trust model that extends beyond instruction/data separation to encompass trusted/untrusted data isolation within agent contexts.

In summary, this paper makes the following contributions.

- We identify the lack of isolation between trusted and untrusted data in the agent context as a new attack surface (§3.2).
- We present probabilistic delimiter injection, the first attack technique to exploit the LLM's probabilistic misinterpretation of inexact delimiters, as the core attack technique of ADI (§3.3, §6.1).
- We reveal that various data formats used by agents can be exploited, demonstrating this with proof-of-concept attacks against real-world agents (§4).
- We study the effectiveness of existing IPI mitigations against ADI, most of which fail to reliably prevent it (§5, §6.2).

Open Science Policy. In support of open science, we release our artifacts, including the probabilistic delimiter injection benchmark and the extended AgentDojo benchmark [19] with ADI attacks, on GitHub.[1]

Responsible Disclosure. We reported all vulnerabilities to affected agent vendors before submission, including Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, and Nanobrowser. OpenAI, Google, and Anthropic have acknowledged the reported issues, and we have not yet received a response from Nanobrowser. We will continue to coordinate with all vendors throughout the review process.

1. https://github.com/compsec-snu/adi



Figure 1: Architecture and workflow of an AI agent.



Figure 2: Agent Data Format with Delimiters

2. Background

2.1. Agent Context in AI Agents

2.1.1. AI Agents. AI agents autonomously perform tasks on behalf of users by interacting with external environments such as file systems and web services [20]. An AI agent maintains an agent context, which contains all relevant information for a given task (*e.g.*, user prompt, tool responses), and interacts with an LLM and tools. §2.1.2 details the agent context.

Figure 1 illustrates the workflow of an AI agent. Initially, the agent context only contains the system prompt, which includes tool descriptions and the guidelines for the agent's behavior. When a user provides the user prompt (❶), the agent appends it to the agent context. The agent then sends the agent context to the LLM, and the LLM returns its decision (❷), such as calling a tool or generating the final answer. If the LLM decides to call a tool, the agent invokes the tool (❸). The tool interacts with the external environment (❹) and returns the tool response to the agent context (❺). The agent may repeat this loop (❷-❺) until the LLM determines that the task is complete. Finally, the agent returns the final answer to the user (❻).

2.1.2. Agent Context. The agent context consists of two main categories, instruction and agent data [9].

Instruction. The instruction guides the behavior of the LLM, serving a role conceptually similar to code in traditional software. Instructions are primarily conveyed through the system prompt and user prompt. The system prompt, written by the agent developer, defines the agent's behavior and typically includes tool descriptions and safety guidelines. The user prompt represents the task provided by the user.



Figure 3: Two categories of indirect prompt injection attacks, instruction injection attack and agent data injection attack (ADI).

Agent Data. Agent data refers to information generated or retrieved during the agent's execution. Agent data is not explicitly intended to control agent behavior, which is conceptually similar to non-executable data in traditional software. Nevertheless, such data still indirectly influences agent behavior by providing context for the LLM's decisions.

Agent Data Format. When agents invoke LLMs, the agent data must be structured in a format that the LLM can correctly interpret, such as JSON, Markdown, XML, or custom formats with application-specific delimiters.

The key elements of agent data format are delimiters. Delimiters are character sequences that separate different components of agent data. In agent data, delimiters serve to distinguish three levels of structure: (i) tool call blocks, where each block consists of a tool call and corresponding tool response; (ii) objects, where each object represents a data item within a tool call block, such as an email or a file; and (iii) fields, where each field represents a data attribute within an object, such as the sender or body of an email. Figure 2 illustrates the example agent data format, showing a simplification of Claude's data format [21]. At the tool call block level, `<call>` and `<results>` tags separate tool calls from their responses. At the object level, curly braces (`{` and `}`) distinguish individual data items within a tool call block. At the field level, colons (`:`) and quotation marks (`"`) separate field names from their values.

2.2. Indirect Prompt Injection Attack

Indirect prompt injection (IPI) attack is the most well-studied attacks against AI agents [6, 22–25] (illustrated in Figure 3). The attacker is a remote adversary who cannot directly edit the agent's system prompt or user prompt. Instead, the attacker is able to partially control the agent data through external resources that the agent's tools retrieve, such as emails, web pages, shared documents, or GitHub issue comments. Thus, the attacker can embed malicious data in those external resources when the LLM interprets the retrieved agent data, causing the agent's behavior to be altered in ways the user did not intend.

The root cause of IPI is that, unlike traditional software where code and data are strictly separated [26], the agent context combines various components (i.e., instructions and agent data) without an enforced boundary between them. Due to the probabilistic nature of LLMs, an attacker who can inject malicious data into the agent context may cause the LLM to misinterpret this attacker-controlled data as a different component, making the agent perform actions that the user did not intend.

The most representative category of IPI is instruction injection attacks [6, 22–25]. In instruction injection, the attacker crafts malicious data so that the LLM misinterprets it as an instruction and follows the attacker's task, rather than the user's original task. For example, a malicious email may instruct the agent to ignore the user's request and forward confidential messages to the attacker, which the LLM follows as if it were a user instruction.

3. Agent Data Injection Attack

This section presents ADI, a new category of IPI that exploits the lack of isolation between trusted and untrusted data in agent contexts. We describe the threat model (§3.1), define the attack (§3.2), and present the probabilistic delimiter injection technique that realizes it (§3.3).

3.1. Threat Model

As a category of IPI attacks, ADI shares the same threat model as prior IPI attacks [6], which we now describe.

Agents and Tools. Agents use tools to interact with external resources, such as reading emails or browsing webpages. These external resources are hosted by third-party services, such as email providers and websites. In our threat model, agents, tools, and third-party services are benign and faithfully implemented. However, these services may host user-generated content that an attacker can control, such as review comments or emails. The security goal of agents is to ensure that their actions remain consistent with the user's intentions, regardless of external content.

Attacker. The attacker can write content to external resources that agents later retrieve. Examples include posting review comments on websites or sending emails. The attacker cannot manipulate the agent, system prompt, or user prompt. The attacker's goal is to manipulate external content such that the agent performs actions not intended by the user.

We assume the attacker knows the data format used by the target agent. This assumption holds in practice, as the attacker can recover the format through several means, which we discuss in §7.

3.2. Attack Definition and Formalization

Unlike prior instruction injection that exploits the lack of isolation between the instruction and the agent data, ADI

exploits the lack of isolation within the agent data itself, between trusted and untrusted data. To clearly define ADI compared to instruction injection, we first formalize the notions of trusted and untrusted data. Specifically, we denote the agent data as $D = (D_T, D_U)$, where D_T is trusted data and D_U is untrusted data.

Trusted data (D_T). Trusted data D_T is generated by the tool or agent itself according to its internal logic. Examples of D_T include metadata such as the `sender` field in an email object, the `url` field in a webpage object, and the tool name in a tool call block. D_T serves as a security anchor that the LLM relies on to make correct decisions and to correctly interpret its environment.

Untrusted data (D_U). Untrusted data D_U is the data that can be directly or indirectly controlled by attackers. This includes data that is retrieved from external resources with little or no transformation by the tool or agent. Examples of D_U include the email body and user-generated content on webpages, such as comments. Because attackers can set D_U to arbitrary values, the LLM must not rely on D_U for sensitive decisions without proper validation.

Example: Email Tool Call Block. Figure 2 shows an example email tool call block containing a tool call and its response formatted as a JSON object. Within the tool call block, both trusted and untrusted data are present. At the tool call block level, D_T includes the tool name `get_emails`. Within the email object, all keys (*e.g.*, `email_id`, `sender`, `subject`, and `body`) belong to D_T, as they are assigned by the trusted email tool. The values, in contrast, can be either trusted or untrusted: the values of `email_id` and `sender` are D_T, generated by the email service backend, whereas the values of `subject` and `body` are D_U, fully controllable by attackers. This mixing of trusted and untrusted data within the same tool call block is common across agent tools and creates the attack surface that ADI exploits.

Formalization: Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI). Inspired by the formalization of IPI in [27], we now formalize ADI and contrast it with instruction injection. The agent context is a combination of an instruction I with the agent data $D = (D_T, D_U)$. Then the LLM call is expressed as a function call $\mathrm{LLM}(I, D)$, which takes I and D as input and outputs the tool calls and the final answer. Here, IPI injects data D_A into D_U, written $D_U \| D_A$, denoting that D_A is embedded in D_U. Using this notation, we now formalize the two categories of IPI in turn, instruction injection and ADI.

Formalization: Instruction injection (II). In the well-studied II, the LLM is called with I and $D = (D_T, D_U \| D_A)$, where the attacker injected D_A into D_U (Equation 1, left). If II is successful, the LLM misinterprets part of D_A as part of I. That is, II makes the LLM produce almost the same output as if D_A were embedded in I (Equation 1, right).

$$\mathrm{LLM}(I, (D_T, D_U \| D_A)) \approx_{\mathrm{II}} \mathrm{LLM}(I \| D_A, (D_T, D_U)), \quad (1)$$

where $\approx_{\mathrm{II}}$ denotes that the two sides produce almost the same output under attack class II. Instruction injection thus exploits the lack of isolation between I and D.



Figure 4: An example of ADI against an email agent. The attacker's email embeds a malicious payload in the body field (red, untrusted data), whose probabilistic JSON delimiters forge a second email object with a spoofed sender (`alice@gmail.com`). Green fields are trusted data generated by the email tool.

Formalization: Agent data injection (ADI). Under ADI, similar to II, the LLM is called with the same input I and $D = (D_T, D_U \| D_A)$, where the attacker injected D_A into D_U (Equation 2, left). The difference is that, while II causes the LLM to misinterpret D_A as part of I, ADI causes the LLM to misinterpret D_A as part of D_T. As a result, ADI makes the LLM produce almost the same output as if D_A were embedded in D_T (Equation 2, right).

$$\mathrm{LLM}(I, (D_T, D_U \| D_A)) \approx_{\mathrm{ADI}} \mathrm{LLM}(I, (D_T \| D_A, D_U)). \quad (2)$$

ADI thus exploits the lack of isolation between D_T and D_U within the agent data D.

Comparison between II and ADI. II and ADI are different in how the attacker causes the LLM to treat D_A (Figure 3). In II, the attacker causes the LLM to treat D_A as part of I, so the agent no longer performs the user's intended task, and instead performs the attacker's task. In ADI, the attacker causes the LLM to treat D_A as part of D_T, so the agent still performs the user's intended task but with attacker-controlled data. This difference makes existing II defenses ineffective against ADI, because they prevent the LLM from misinterpreting D_A as part of I, but not as part of D_T. Defending against ADI thus requires a different defense design that prevents the LLM from misinterpreting D_A as part of D_T. We further analyze this in §5 and evaluate it in §6.2.

3.3. Attack Mechanism

This section describes the mechanism of ADI. The attack exploits the gap between how tools process delimiters and how LLMs interpret them. We first explain the probabilistic delimiter injection, and then how ADI leverages it to cause LLMs to misinterpret untrusted data as trusted data.

Probabilistic delimiter injection. Delimiters define the structural boundaries within the agent data, separating entries at the tool call block, object, and field levels. As a consequence, delimiters also separate trusted data from untrusted data. By correctly interpreting delimiters, the LLM can distinguish which data is trusted and which is untrusted.

For example, in a JSON-formatted email object, the quotation marks and colons separate the trusted field name `"sender"` from its trusted value, and separate the trusted field name `"body"` from its untrusted content.

Probabilistic Delimiter Injection as an Attack Technique. Probabilistic delimiter injection is the core attack technique of ADI, where the attacker injects *probabilistic delimiters* into untrusted data fields to cause the LLM to misinterpret the data structure. A probabilistic delimiter is an attacker-injected character sequence that the tool treats as plain-text, but the LLM misinterprets as a structural delimiter. As a result, the LLM's view of the data structure diverges from the actual structure, thereby causing part of the attacker-injected data to be interpreted as trusted data.

We call this technique probabilistic delimiter injection because the LLM, unlike a deterministic parser, interprets the data probabilistically, so the injected delimiter need not exactly replicate the original delimiter. Surprisingly, the LLM misinterprets even inexact, parser-invalid delimiters as valid ones (see §6.1). For instance, even when a tool applies escaping to the injected content (*e.g.*, " into \"), the LLM still interprets the escaped sequence as a structural delimiter.

Comparison: Previous deterministic delimiter injection. Unlike probabilistic delimiter injection, we categorize the prior delimiter injection attacks as *deterministic delimiter injection*, because those must inject precisely matching delimiters to succeed. For instance, in the previous SQL injection and cross-site scripting (XSS) [4, 5], attackers must inject precise delimiters (e.g., a single quote `'` for SQL injection and an HTML tag `<script>` for XSS) that a deterministic parser would recognize as structural boundaries. This is because the previous attacks rely on the implementation of deterministic parsers that strictly match the injected delimiters to the expected syntax.

It is worth noting that prior instruction injection attacks that inject delimiters [28, 29] are deterministic delimiter injection attacks as well. Although they target the LLM, they inject precisely matching delimiters and do not exploit the LLM's misinterpretation of inexact ones. ADI instead performs *probabilistic delimiter injection*, injecting inexact delimiters that a deterministic parser would reject. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to systematically characterize and exploit this probabilistic misinterpretation.

Example: Probabilistic delimiter injection under ADI. Figure 4 revisits the email tool call block of Figure 2, now under ADI. The attacker sends an email with a malicious payload in the body field. The payload contains probabilistic delimiters that create the appearance of an additional email object with a spoofed `sender` field. In the actual data structure, the injected content is part of the body field of the email from `attacker@gmail.com`. However, the LLM interprets the probabilistic delimiters as structural boundaries, perceiving a second email that appears to be from `alice@gmail.com`.

4. ADI Attacks against Real-World Agents

We demonstrate attacks against real-world AI agents, exploiting the ADI vulnerability. We introduce three attacks targeting popular web agents (§4.1) and coding agents (§4.2 and §4.3), each of which abuses a different type of trusted data used in agents. We further demonstrate additional ADI attacks against other agent types in §C.

4.1. Arbitrary Click Attack via Element ID Injection

Web agents automate web browsing tasks for users, such as summarizing product reviews on e-commerce websites. This section demonstrates a critical ADI vulnerability in web agents that allows an attacker to perform arbitrary click attacks. This attack is conceptually similar to XSS [4]. While XSS injects malicious scripts into webpages to execute them in the victim's browser, ADI injects malicious content into webpages to execute attacker-controlled actions in the agent. We confirmed this vulnerability in real-world web agents, including Claude in Chrome [2], Antigravity [17][2], and Nanobrowser [18].

Benign Workflow. We first explain how web agents process webpages, as illustrated in Figure 5 (left). When a user requests the agent to summarize product reviews on an e-commerce website (❶), the agent invokes the `read_page` tool to fetch the webpage content (❷). `read_page` processes the raw HTML and produces two outputs: (i) a webpage summary and (ii) a map between element identifiers and actual DOM elements. `read_page` produces the summary through a rule-based process. It strips HTML tags and removes invisible content, then assigns a unique element identifier (*e.g.*, `[ref_1]`, `[ref_2]`) to each of the remaining elements, including both interactive elements (*e.g.*, buttons, links) and visible text content (*e.g.*, `<p>`, `<span>`). For instance, a button element such as `<button id="next">Next Page</button>` is represented as `button "Next Page" [ref_7]` in the summary. The map is maintained internally by the agent and is not exposed to the LLM. It stores the correspondence between these identifiers and actual DOM elements. This `read_page`'s processing allows the LLM to reason over a compact representation of the page, while the agent uses the map to execute precise actions on the actual DOM elements. The agent sends this summary to the LLM (❸). For clarity, we refer to this page-reading functionality as the `read_page` tool throughout the paper.

Based on the webpage summary, the LLM notices that the webpage requires a button click to load more reviews. As such, the LLM decides to click the "Next Page" button and generates the command `left_click([ref_7])` (❹), where `[ref_7]` is the element identifier assigned to the "Next Page" button (❺). The agent uses the previously generated map to resolve `[ref_7]` to the actual DOM element of the "Next Page" button, and clicks the real button on the webpage.

2. While Antigravity is a coding agent, it supports web browsing feature and we tested it.



Figure 5: Element ID injection attack on web agents. Left: benign workflow. Right: ADI attack workflow.

In this benign workflow, the security mechanism works as expected: the agent clicks the intended element based on the trusted element identifier.

ADI Attack Workflow. Now, we describe how ADI bypasses the security mechanism that relies on element identifiers, as shown in Figure 5 (right). We first explain how the attacker achieves probabilistic delimiter injection, and then how it is exploited to perform ADI.

In order to achieve probabilistic delimiter injection, the attacker injects a fake entry into the webpage summary returned by the `read_page` tool. The delimiters in the webpage summary are simply newlines with text-based element identifiers (e.g., `button "Next" [ref_7]`). The attacker can inject text with a similar format within untrusted content (i.e., a product review). This makes the LLM's interpretation of the webpage summary diverge from the tool's intended structure. Specifically, the tool intended that the webpage summary contains two entries: the button and text entry (marked as green boxes in Figure 5). However, the LLM interprets the summary as containing three entries: the button, the text entry, and the injected fake button entry (marked as red boxes). Note that the attacker corrupts neither the actual DOM structure nor the internal map maintained by the agent. The attacker only corrupts the webpage summary by leaving a crafted review on the target webpage, which is sent to the LLM.

Exploiting probabilistic delimiter injection, the attacker performs ADI by injecting a fake entry that reuses an existing element identifier (*i.e.*, trusted data). In the crafted product review, the attacker injects text containing a fake element description, such as `button "Read More" [ref_3]`, where `[ref_3]` matches the identifier assigned to the legitimate "Buy Now" button. Because typical web agents assign identifiers deterministically based on element order, the attacker can predict this identifier in advance. When the user requests the agent to summarize product reviews (❶–❸), the injected payload is included in the webpage summary sent to the LLM. The LLM misinterprets the injected text as a legitimate "Read More" button (❹) and attempts to click it to read additional review content, generating `left_click([ref_3])` (❺). The agent uses the internal map to resolve `[ref_3]` to the actual DOM element, which corresponds to the "Buy Now" button, and clicks it (❻). Consequently, the agent performs an unintended purchase on behalf of the user. Throughout the attack, the LLM is still performing the user's intended task of summarizing product reviews. ADI corrupts only the trusted element identifiers in the page summary, causing the agent to click an attacker-chosen UI element instead of a legitimate one. This breaks the security assumption that element identifiers are a trusted anchor that maps LLM decisions to the correct DOM elements.

ADI against Real-World Web Agents. We found that the following three real-world web agents were vulnerable to ADI: Claude in Chrome [2], Antigravity [17], and Nanobrowser [18]. The full attack payloads and PoC screenshots are available in §E.1.

We confirmed that all three agents provided the page-reading functionality described above, though the concrete implementation varied. Nanobrowser did not expose a page-reading tool to the LLM but automatically injected the page's summary into the agent context at each step. Antigravity also used coordinate positions of elements as reference metadata (*e.g.*, `[1] (510,410)`), and we were able to inject fake coordinates to make the agent click an attacker-specified position. Claude in Chrome required user confirmation before clicking elements, but the confirmation message only stated that the agent intended to click an element without specifying which element or why (Figure 13). Users could not distinguish legitimate clicks from those induced by injected data, allowing the attack to succeed. All three used numerical identifiers that increased sequentially (*e.g.*, `[ref_1]`, `[ref_2]`, `[ref_3]`), making them predictable. We explain how we identified these behaviors in §7.

Unsuccessful Attack. The attack was unsuccessful against ChatGPT Atlas [30] because it used a nonce randomized at runtime as the element identifier (*e.g.*, `ref_4af2b1c9`), making it difficult for an attacker to predict the identifier of the target element. We discuss more about this defense in §5 and empirically evaluate its effectiveness in §6.1.

Security Impact. This attack enables an attacker to inject fake element identifiers, which allows an attacker to map

a crafted element identifier to a sensitive UI element, such as a "Buy Now" button. Depending on which resource is associated with identifiers, the attack can lead to various security impacts. For example, in cloud storage services, where an attacker can share a file with a victim user, injecting a fake file identifier can lead the agent to perform unintended operations on the victim's sensitive files.

4.2. Remote Code Execution via Origin Injection

Coding agents offer various assistant features that automate software development tasks. A common workflow is applying a fix for an error discussed in GitHub issues of public open source projects (*e.g.*, PyTorch [31], TensorFlow [32]): the agent fetches issue comments, identifies a recommended fix from a maintainer, and applies it by executing commands on the developer's machine. This section demonstrates a critical ADI vulnerability in this workflow that allows an attacker to achieve remote code execution on a developer's local machine by simply posting issue comments. The attacker exploits the lack of isolation between trusted origin metadata (e.g., author name) and untrusted comment content to inject fake origin information that tricks the agent into executing malicious commands. We confirmed this vulnerability in real-world coding agents, including Claude Code [15], Codex [16], and Gemini CLI [3].

Benign Workflow. Before describing the attack, we first explain how coding agents use origin information as a security anchor when processing GitHub issues, illustrated in Figure 6 (left). When a user (i.e., a software developer) requests a fix for an error by referencing a related issue (❶), the agent invokes a tool such as `read_issue` to retrieve the issue content (❷). Since untrusted GitHub users can leave malicious suggestions in the comments, a software developer would naturally instruct the agent to apply only the maintainer's fix. The tool response includes origin information for each comment, such as the author name and role (e.g., maintainer) (❸). This origin information serves as a security anchor that enables the LLM to follow only recommendations from trusted sources, as the user instructed. In this benign scenario, the security mechanism works as expected. If the command originates from an untrusted user such as `eve456`, the agent refuses to execute it (❹). We confirmed that all coding agents we tested generally follow this workflow. For clarity, we refer to this issue-reading functionality as the `read_issue` tool throughout the paper.

ADI Attack Workflow. Now, we describe how ADI bypasses the security mechanism that relies on origin information, as shown in Figure 6 (right).

To achieve probabilistic delimiter injection, the attacker posts a crafted issue comment on the target GitHub issue page. The `read_issue` tool returns issue comments in a structured format where delimiters separate individual comment objects and their fields (*e.g.*, author name and comment body). For instance, in JSON format, curly braces (`{, }`) and quotation marks (") delimit comment objects and fields, while in plain text format, newlines and bold text formatting serve as delimiters. The attacker injects text containing probabilistic delimiters within the comment body (*i.e.*, untrusted data). This corrupts the LLM's interpretation of the issue comments, which diverges from the tool's intention. Specifically, the tool intended that the response contains a single comment (marked as green boxes in Figure 6), but the LLM interprets it as also containing a fake comment injected by the attacker (marked as red boxes).

Exploiting probabilistic delimiter injection, the attacker performs ADI by setting the author information (*i.e.*, trusted data) in the fake comment object to an attacker-chosen username with a maintainer role indicator. The injected content also suggests a shell command that appears to resolve the issue, but actually executes arbitrary attacker-controlled code. When the user requests to apply a fix from the maintainer, as in the benign scenario (❶–❸), the LLM misinterprets the injected text as a legitimate maintainer comment (❹). Consequently, the agent executes the malicious command from the attacker (❺), allowing the attacker to achieve remote code execution in the user's environment. Throughout the attack, the LLM is still performing the user's intended task of applying the maintainer's fix. ADI corrupts only the trusted author and role metadata of the comment, causing the agent to execute a command from an attacker rather than from an actual maintainer.

This attack breaks the security assumption that origin metadata is a trusted anchor for validating command suggestions. The assumption holds true at the tool response level, but not at the level of the LLM's interpretation, which ADI corrupts with fake origin information.

ADI against Real-World Coding Agents. We confirmed that three coding agents, Claude Code [15], Codex [16], and Gemini CLI [3], are vulnerable to ADI. We provide the full attack payloads and PoC screenshots in §E.2.

We confirmed by examining the tool calls and their outputs during agent execution that all three agents use one of two `read_issue` implementations, the GitHub CLI command (`gh`) [33] and the GitHub MCP server tools [34], both developed by GitHub and open source, which fetch issue content via the GitHub API. Regardless of the implementation, probabilistic delimiter injection was successful. The GitHub CLI returns issue comments in either JSON format (with the `--json` flag) or plain text format (without the flag). For JSON, ADI injects probabilistic delimiters (*e.g.*, `\"`) to create fake comment objects. For plain text, the attacker injects fake origin information with bold text and newlines to mimic the response format. The GitHub MCP server tools return issue comments in JSON format and are exploited in the same way as the GitHub CLI JSON case.

By default, all three agents request user approval by displaying a confirmation message before executing any bash command, but this message was insufficient in preventing the attack. The agent shows reasoning steps that justify executing the command based on a misinterpretation of tool results, as if the maintainer left a fix in the comment. Therefore, the user is likely to be tricked into assuming that the maintainer actually left a fix, and approve the action (Figure 16).



Figure 6: Origin injection attack on coding agents. Left: benign workflow. Right: ADI attack workflow.



Figure 7: Tool call injection attack on coding agents. Left: benign workflow. Right: ADI attack workflow.

Security Impact. This attack enables an attacker to forge data origin metadata, which agents and users rely on as a security anchor to determine the trustworthiness of external content. For example, agents may be instructed to only trust suggestions from maintainers, emails from managers, or messages from known colleagues. By spoofing origin metadata, an attacker can make malicious content appear to originate from these trusted sources. In the GitHub scenario demonstrated above, this enables remote code execution by making attacker commands appear to come from a maintainer.

4.3. Supply Chain Attack via Tool Call and Response Injection

Another common workflow for coding agents is automating pull request (PR) reviews on GitHub. When a software developer receives a PR from an external contributor, the developer can instruct the agent to review the code changes and merge the PR if it passes the review.

This section demonstrates a critical ADI vulnerability in this workflow that allows an attacker to perform a supply chain attack by simply submitting a crafted PR. Specifically, by abusing probabilistic delimiter injection, the attacker can trick the agent into merging a malicious PR without actually reviewing its code. We confirmed this vulnerability in real-world coding agents, including Claude Code [15], Codex [16], and Gemini CLI [3].

Benign Workflow. We first explain how coding agents review and merge PRs, illustrated in Figure 7 (left). When a user requests the agent to review and merge PR 23 (❶), the agent first retrieves the PR description using the `read_pr_desc` tool (❷). The tool returns the PR description (which does not include the actual code commit) (❸), and then the agent sends it to the LLM for analysis. Based on the PR description, the LLM determines that it needs to examine the actual code changes and instructs the agent to fetch the code commits using the `read_pr_commit` tool (❹). The tool returns the code commit for PR 23 (❺). The agent reviews the code commit using the LLM and determines whether to merge the PR. In this benign workflow, the security mechanism works as expected: the agent reviews the actual code commits and refuses to merge the PR if it contains a malicious patch (❻).

ADI Attack Workflow. Figure 7 (right) shows how ADI bypasses the security mechanism that relies on the tool call block structure. To achieve ADI, the attacker injects probabilistic delimiters within the PR description. Tool call blocks in coding agents are delimited by specific tag-based delimiters (*e.g.*, Claude Code uses `<function_calls>` and `<function_results>` tags). By injecting text containing these tag-based delimiters within the PR description (*i.e.*, untrusted

data), the attacker creates a fake tool call block that mimics the block of the `read_pr_commit` tool. The injected payload reproduces both a fake tool call invoking `read_pr_commit` and a fake tool result containing a benign-looking commit, so the LLM treats the benign commit as the real output of `read_pr_commit`. This corrupts the LLM's interpretation of the tool execution history, which diverges from the agent's intention. Specifically, the agent intended that its context contains a single tool call block for `read_pr_desc` (marked as a green box in Figure 7), but the LLM interprets the context as also containing a fake tool call block for `read_pr_commit` (marked as red boxes).

Exploiting probabilistic delimiter injection, the attacker performs ADI by fabricating a tool execution history. To this end, the attacker submits a crafted PR (❶) with two components: the PR description contains the probabilistic delimiter injection payload (a fake tool call block for `read_pr_commit` showing a benign commit), while the actual PR commit contains malicious code. When the user requests a review (❷), the agent retrieves the PR description using `read_pr_desc` (❸). The LLM misinterprets the injected probabilistic delimiters as legitimate structural boundaries, perceiving two tool call blocks instead of one. As a result, the LLM believes that a call to `read_pr_commit` has already been made (❹) and that its response contains a benign commit (❺), even though the tool was never actually invoked. Based on this fabricated execution history (❻), the LLM reviews the benign commit in the fake tool call block and concludes that the PR is safe. Consequently, the LLM instructs the agent to merge it (❼), even though the actual commit contains malicious code. Throughout the attack, the LLM is still performing the user's intended task of reviewing and merging the PR. ADI corrupts only the trusted tool execution history, causing the agent to review a fabricated, benign commit and merge the actually malicious PR.

This attack breaks the security assumption that the PR should be properly reviewed before merging it. ADI breaks this assumption by injecting fabricated tool call blocks, which makes the agent review a (fake) benign commit but merge a malicious one.

ADI against Real-World Coding Agents. We found that the following three real-world agents are vulnerable to ADI: Claude Code [15], Codex [16], and Gemini CLI [3]. The attack payloads and PoC screenshots are available in §E.3.

We confirmed that all three agents use one of two implementations of the `read_pr_desc` and `read_pr_commit` tools, the GitHub CLI commands (`gh pr view` and `gh pr diff`) [33], and the GitHub MCP server tools [34]. We also identified each agent's tool call block delimiters through jailbreak attacks against the LLM (§7).

Claude Code uses explicit tags for tool call blocks, `<function_calls>` and `<function_results>`. Codex relies on newline separation between tool calls and responses. Gemini CLI uses `<~>` for tool calls and `<ctrl46>`, `<tool_response_start>`, and `<tool_response_end>` for tool responses. In all cases, the attacker could imitate the delimiters in the injected text.

TABLE 1: Summary of defense effectiveness against ADI.

Defense	Prevents ADI	Limitation
Model Hardening	×	–
Input Guardrails	×	–
Output Guardrails	×	–
Plan-Then-Execute	×	–
Agent Sandboxing	✓	Requires fine-grained policy
Dual-LLM	×	–
Data Flow Tracking	✓	Requires fine-grained policy
Randomization	✓	Key-value formats only
Sanitization	✓	Large utility drop

As in §4.2, all three agents request user approval before executing any bash command by default, and thus displayed a confirmation message before merging the PR. However, the LLM's reasoning steps shown to the user were based on its misinterpretation of the tool execution structure, making the malicious merge appear safe (Figure 20). Therefore, user confirmation alone could not prevent this attack. A developer who manually re-checks the PR outside the agent could detect the attack, but this defeats the purpose of using an agent for automated review.

Security Impact. This attack enables an attacker to fabricate an entire tool execution history, providing broad control over the agent's view of past actions. Unlike element ID or origin injection that target specific metadata fields, tool call block injection allows attackers to craft arbitrary tool calls and responses, manipulating any trusted data that appears in tool outputs. For example, attackers can fabricate verification results to bypass security checks, as demonstrated in the PR review scenario above. In shopping agents, attackers can fabricate price comparisons or product reviews to mislead users into purchasing overpriced or low-quality products.

5. Effectiveness of ADI against Defenses

Existing defenses for AI agents primarily focus on preventing instruction injection attacks and do not adequately address ADI. We analyze whether existing defenses can prevent ADI and discuss future directions to improve each defense. We further evaluate these defenses empirically in §6.2. Table 1 summarizes our analysis.

Model Hardening. Model hardening trains models to distinguish instructions from agent data through techniques such as role assignment [9], structured input templates [35], and special delimiter tokens [10]. However, current model hardening schemes provide no protection within agent data, where trusted (*e.g.*, system-generated metadata) and untrusted content (*e.g.*, comments from a web page) coexist, which is exactly what ADI exploits. Extending instruction/data separation training to distinguish trusted from untrusted data within agent data could address this limitation.

Input Guardrail. Input guardrails use classifiers to detect instruction injection patterns before input reaches the LLM [11, 12]. However, ADI payloads do not contain instruction injection patterns such as "ignore previous instructions." Instead, they contain probabilistic delimiters

and data that resembles legitimate agent data, which input guardrails are not trained to detect. In the future, training guardrail classifiers to detect probabilistic delimiter injection patterns (*e.g.*, fake tool outputs, spoofed metadata) could improve detection.

Alignment-based Output Guardrail. Output guardrails use AI models to decide, based on the entire agent context, whether the agent's actions (*e.g.*, tool calls) align with the user prompt [36]. However, such guardrails are ineffective against ADI. Unlike instruction injection, which makes the agent perform the attacker's task instead of the user's intended task, ADI corrupts only the data the agent acts on, leaving the agent's task aligned with the user prompt. To mitigate ADI, the guardrail model could additionally be prompted or trained to validate the agent's interpretation of the data it acts on.

Plan-Then-Execute. In plan-then-execute style defenses [37–39], the agent first generates a plan (*e.g.*, a list of actions) based on the user prompt, and then follows the plan. This is often achieved by separating an agent into a planner agent and executor agents that perform specific actions, including retrieving untrusted data. While the initial plan stays intact, untrusted data returned from executor agents can still be used in subsequent actions within the plan. Thus, ADI can still control the agent by injecting malicious data, such as resource identifiers or data origins. To limit the attack surface of ADI, one may consider making the plan more concrete and fine-grained (*e.g.*, fixed actions with exact arguments). However, this would reduce utility as the agent loses flexibility to adapt its actions based on intermediate results.

Agent Sandboxing. Agent sandboxing restricts agent actions based on predefined policies [40, 41]. Agent sandboxing can defend against ADI if the policy is well-defined and fine-grained enough. However, such a policy is costly to implement and maintain, considering the broad tools that agents can use. Recent work leverages AI models to automate policy generation [40, 42], but to the best of our knowledge, there is currently no practical approach to automatically generate fine-grained policies with high accuracy.

Dual-LLM. The dual-LLM defense isolates two LLMs in the agent: a main LLM that reads trusted data only and decides the subsequent tool calls, and a quarantined LLM that processes untrusted data into variables (*e.g.*, `summary`) but is not permitted to invoke any tools [13, 14, 43–45]. This design prevents instruction injection, as the main LLM that selects tool calls never directly reads the raw untrusted data. However, dual-LLM does not prevent ADI, because ADI corrupts the quarantined LLM's processing of untrusted data, making it return variables whose values are attacker-controlled, which the main LLM then uses in subsequent tool calls. To mitigate ADI, dual-LLM systems can be combined with data flow tracking, which we discuss next.

Data Flow Tracking. Data flow tracking attaches security labels (*e.g.*, provenance of data) to agent data and propagates the labels through subsequent LLM outputs [13, 14, 44–46]. By tracking data flow, agents can enforce policies on how data is used in each action. Fine-grained data flow tracking with correct label propagation and a well-defined policy can mitigate ADI. However, writing a well-defined data flow policy is difficult given the broad set of data and actions involved in agent workflows, and tracking labels at the granularity needed to block ADI often degrades utility, especially when agents need to interpret large, complex, and unstructured data (*e.g.*, web pages).

Randomization. Randomization attaches a runtime-generated nonce to field names or element identifiers, making the data structure unpredictable to attackers. For instance, as mentioned in §4.1, ChatGPT Atlas [30] uses randomized identifiers (*e.g.*, `ref_4af2b1c9`) instead of predictable sequential indices, preventing attackers from injecting colliding identifiers. Our evaluation (§6.1) shows that randomization significantly reduces attack success rates when attackers cannot guess the nonce. However, this defense only applies to key-value formats (*e.g.*, JSON, web DOM) and cannot protect unstructured formats (*e.g.*, Markdown).

Sanitization. Sanitization is a widely used defense against deterministic delimiter injection [4, 5]. It removes or escapes delimiters from untrusted input so that they are not interpreted as a valid delimiter. Deterministic delimiter injection relies on a specific delimiter that the sanitizer can target, but ADI can inject various probabilistic delimiters, so the sanitizer must instead strip a broad range of characters from untrusted fields. However, untrusted fields carry legitimate content with delimiters, such as URLs and file paths, that benign tasks must read, so sanitization would corrupt this content and degrade utility. Our evaluation (§6.1) shows that sanitization lowers attack success rates but incurs a large utility cost.

6. Evaluation

We evaluate ADI from two perspectives. First, we measure how vulnerable off-the-shelf LLMs are to probabilistic delimiter injection attacks in isolation (§6.1). Second, we evaluate the effectiveness of ADI in the agent setting, with existing agent defense mechanisms (§6.2). We tested six LLM APIs: OpenAI GPT-5.2 (2025-12-11) and GPT-5-mini (2025-08-07), Anthropic Claude Opus 4.5 (2025-11-01) and Claude Sonnet 4.5 (2025-09-29), and Google Gemini 3 Pro and Gemini 3 Flash (preview). For the agent-level evaluation, we used OpenAI GPT-5.2.

6.1. Probabilistic Delimiter Injection on LLMs

We evaluate probabilistic delimiter injection (§3.3) on LLMs in isolation. The design of our benchmark is inspired by Kate et al. [47].

6.1.1. Evaluation Setup. Data categories. We test seven categories representing real-world tool response scenarios: calendar events, cloud drive files, GitHub comments, email, GitHub issues, paper reviews, and web DOM. For each category, we define untrusted fields for payload injection and target fields that the attacker aims to corrupt, spanning 157 test cases in total (Table 5).

	JSON								Web DOM							
	Baseline		Randomization				Sanitization		Baseline		Randomization				Sanitization	
Model	Util	ASR	Util	ASR-N	ASR-C	ASR-W	Util	ASR	Util	ASR	Util	ASR-N	ASR-C	ASR-W	Util	ASR
GPT-5.2	84.8	41.8	83.9	3.0	1.5	1.5	67.9	3.0	97.8	100.0	97.8	0.0	100.0	0.0	68.3	8.3
GPT-5-mini	83.0	40.3	83.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	70.5	0.0	97.8	100.0	97.8	0.0	100.0	0.0	73.3	0.0
Claude Opus 4.5	81.2	34.3	74.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	71.4	0.0	100.0	33.3	100.0	0.0	73.3	0.0	75.0	0.0
Claude Sonnet 4.5	83.9	37.3	78.6	3.0	1.5	0.0	70.5	1.5	100.0	60.0	100.0	0.0	93.3	0.0	77.8	26.7
Gemini 3 Pro	84.8	31.3	83.9	0.0	3.0	1.5	69.6	1.5	97.8	33.3	97.8	0.0	60.0	0.0	67.2	0.0
Gemini 3 Flash	83.9	43.3	83.9	0.0	3.0	0.0	72.3	3.0	97.8	93.3	97.8	0.0	100.0	0.0	80.6	18.3

TABLE 2: Defense effectiveness on key-value formats (JSON and web DOM). **Util** is benign utility. Under Randomization, ASR is split by the attacker's nonce guess: **ASR-N** (no guess), **ASR-C** (correct guess), and **ASR-W** (wrong guess).

JSON			Web DOM		
Delimiter	Example	ASR	Delimiter	Example	ASR
`" {} (real)`	`{"k":"v"}`	–	`[] <> (real)`	`[0] <button>`	–
`\" {}`	`{\"k\":\"v\"}`	41.8	`[] <>`	`[0] <button>`	100.0
`' {}`	`{'k':'v'}`	42.6	`{} <>`	`{0} <button>`	53.3
`" {}`	`{"k":"v"}`	43.3	`.. <>`	`.0. <button>`	20.0
`$ {}`	`{$k$:$v$}`	38.8	`[] {}`	`[0] {button}`	40.0
`\" ()`	`(\"k\":\"v\")`	35.8	`[] ()`	`[0] (button)`	33.3

TABLE 3: ASR by injected probabilistic-delimiter variant (GPT-5.2). **Delimiter** is the injected probabilistic delimiter, and **Example** shows the resulting structure.



Figure 8: ASR by structural consistency (JSON only).

Dataset collection. We test two data formats: JSON and web DOM. JSON data was collected from production APIs (GitHub API, Google Workspace via MCP) and anonymized, except for paper reviews, which we created synthetically. Web DOM data was synthesized following the element format of Nanobrowser [18].

Tasks. Our tasks instruct the LLM to either extract a specific field value from a structured response (*e.g.*, "Who wrote the first comment?") or aggregate over the entire response to produce a result (*e.g.*, "How many events are there?").

Attack. For JSON, the attacker corrupts a target field by injecting a probabilistic delimiter (§3.3), by default an escaped double quote (\"), into an untrusted field. For web DOM, the attacker injects a fake button whose element ID collides with the target; since real-world web agents do not escape web delimiters, true delimiters (*e.g.*, `<button>` tags) can be injected directly. For JSON, we also evaluate two attack variants that differ in whether the injected payload conforms to the expected data format: a `consistent` attack (default) injects a structurally complete fake object, while an `inconsistent` attack injects fake fields that do not form a valid structure. We also test the attack with other probabilistic delimiters to assess whether the attack depends on any specific delimiter (Table 3).

Defense. Besides the baseline, we evaluate two defenses, randomization (§5) and sanitization. Randomization attaches a 6-character nonce to field names and element identifiers, which are unpredictable to the attacker. For JSON, the nonce is appended to each field's key name (*e.g.*, `"name"` becomes `"name_f7x9k2"`), and an additional prompt instructs the LLM to trust only fields whose key carries the correct suffix. For web DOM, randomization instead replaces the element indices with nonces, as in ChatGPT Atlas [30] (§4.1). Under randomization, we test three attack scenarios: `no guess` (original identifiers without a nonce), `guess correct` (correct nonce), and `guess wrong` (incorrect nonce). Sanitization, since the attack relies on injected delimiters, strips delimiter-like characters (*e.g.*, quotes and brackets) from untrusted fields before the LLM processes them.

Metric. We measure *benign utility*, the accuracy on benign instances without attacks, and *attack success rate* (ASR), the percentage of attack instances where the LLM returns attacker-injected data. We score each response by string matching against the expected value.

6.1.2. Evaluation Results. Table 2, Table 3, and Figure 8 show the results, which we analyzed with five research questions. Unless otherwise noted, all results used the baseline (no defense), `consistent` attacks, and the default probabilistic delimiter (an escaped double quote \" for JSON, and the real `[]` index bracket for web DOM).

RQ1: How vulnerable are LLMs to probabilistic delimiter injection? As shown in Table 2, all models achieved high benign utility (81.2–84.8% on JSON and 97.8–100.0% on web DOM). However, every model was also vulnerable to probabilistic delimiter injection, with a high baseline ASR of 31.3–43.3% on JSON and 33.3–100.0% on web DOM.

RQ2: Does the attack depend on a specific probabilistic delimiter? We injected probabilistic delimiters that target the real structural delimiters (*e.g.*, the double quote " and braces `{}` in JSON, and the bracket `[]` and `<button>` angle brackets <> in DOM), ranging from visually similar characters (*e.g.*, a curly quote ") to arbitrary unrelated ones (*e.g.*, a dollar sign `$` or parentheses `()`) (Table 3). Various probabilistic delimiters that did not match the real one still

TABLE 4: Defense mechanisms evaluated in the benchmark.

Defense Type	Implementation
Input Guardrails	Llama Prompt Guard 2 [48]
Output Guardrails	LlamaFirewall AlignmentCheck [36]
Plan-Then-Execute	IsolateGPT [38]
Agent Sandboxing	Progent [40]
Dual-LLM	CaMeL (No Policy) [14]
Data Flow Tracking	CaMeL (Normal / Strict) [14]
Randomization	Add random nonce to field names (§5)

achieved substantial ASR (35.8–43.3% on JSON and 20.0–53.3% on web DOM), showing that the LLM misinterpreted inexact, parser-invalid delimiters as valid structural ones.

RQ3: Does structural consistency of the attack payload matter? As shown in Figure 8, across all models, `consistent` attacks on JSON achieved significantly higher ASR (31.3–43.3%) than `inconsistent` attacks (11.8–20.0%). This indicates that structural consistency is critical for successful probabilistic delimiter injection.

RQ4: How effective is the randomization defense? Randomization (Table 2) reduced JSON ASR from 31.3–43.3% to near zero (0.0–3.0%). Even when the attacker correctly guessed the nonce, ASR remained low (0.0–3.0%), confirming that randomization was effective for key-value formats. For web DOM, a missing or incorrect guess likewise dropped ASR to 0.0%, but a correct guess raised it back to 60.0–100.0%, indicating that randomization did not mitigate attacks when the attacker guessed correct IDs.

RQ5: How effective is the sanitization defense? We evaluate a sanitizer that strips from untrusted fields the probabilistic delimiters that RQ2 showed to be effective (Table 3). Because many different characters can serve as the probabilistic delimiter, the sanitizer cannot block a few specific characters and must instead strip a wide range of them. It reduced ASR to 0.0–3.0% on JSON and 0.0–26.7% on web DOM (Table 2, Sanitization), but at a large utility cost. Benign utility dropped from 81.2–84.8% to 67.9–72.3% on JSON and from 97.8–100.0% to 67.2–80.6% on web DOM. This is because untrusted fields can also hold legitimate structured content, such as URLs and file paths, that benign tasks need to read, and the sanitizer strips it along with the attack delimiters. Therefore, sanitization blocks the attack only by destroying the legitimate structured content that agents routinely process, making it an impractical defense.

6.2. Agent Data Injection Attack

6.2.1. Evaluation Setup. Benchmark. We use AgentDojo [19], a benchmark for evaluating indirect prompt injection attacks against AI agents in simulated environments (Slack, cloud drive, email, banking, travel planning). We changed the tool response format from YAML to JSON, which is more common in real-world agent tool responses. We used 96 user tasks across four task suites and added 108 ADI attacks that inject probabilistic delimiters into untrusted fields to corrupt trusted fields (Table 6). We also used the existing 935 instruction injection attacks to compare against ADI.

Metric. We measure attack success rate (ASR), determined by checking tool call history, environment state changes, and string matching on arguments and final answers. We additionally measure utility as the percentage of benign tasks completed correctly without any attack.

Defense. We evaluate seven defense mechanisms (Table 4) discussed in §5. All agents use GPT-5.2 (2025-12-11), where model hardening defenses are applied by default. The Baseline agent uses the ReAct framework without additional defenses [49]. We applied each defense using its open-source implementation. We instantiate both the dual-LLM and data flow tracking defenses with CaMeL [14], evaluating three variants: No Policy (the dual-LLM design without data flow tracking), Normal (data flow tracking with explicit policies), and Strict (additionally tracks implicit flows). We extended CaMeL's security policies to also detect unsafe data flow to the user's final answer.

6.2.2. Evaluation Results. Overview. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the agent evaluation results. As shown in Figure 9, instruction injection attacks achieved near-zero ASR across all defenses (0.0–0.7%), including the Baseline (0.2%), suggesting that model hardening (§5) already provided robustness against instruction injection. In contrast, ADI achieved up to 50.0% ASR. Only CaMeL Strict fully prevented ADI (0% ASR), while all other defenses allowed 22.2–50.0% of attacks to succeed, confirming that ADI represented a unique threat that most existing defenses failed to address.

Input guardrails. Llama Prompt Guard 2 [48] achieved 50.0% ASR, nearly identical to the Baseline (49.1%), detecting none of the 108 ADI payloads while detecting 326 of 935 instruction injection attempts (34.9%). This indicated that input guardrails were not trained to detect ADI payloads.

Output guardrails. LlamaFirewall AlignmentCheck [36] achieved 45.4% ASR, nearly identical to the Baseline (49.1%), returning `allow` for 94 of the 108 ADI attacks and `human_in_the_loop_required` for the remaining 14. Of the 14 flagged cases, only one correctly identified the injected data as the root cause; the remaining 13 cited unrelated reasons, which would mislead the human reviewer into making an incorrect decision. Output guardrails were ineffective because ADI did not alter the agent's intended actions but instead corrupted its data view.

Plan-Then-Execute. IsolateGPT [38] reduced ASR from 49.1% to 40.7%. We suspect that, because the executor agent was only responsible for running planned tool calls and returning results, it paid closer attention to the expected response structure, making it slightly less susceptible to probabilistic delimiter injection. However, 40.7% ASR remained high, indicating that plan-then-execute could not fully prevent ADI that did not change the overall plan of an agent.

Agent sandboxing. Progent [40] reduced ASR from 49.1% to 22.2% by blocking attacks when policies constrained the corrupted arguments, but still failed to prevent over 20% of



Figure 9: ASR of instruction injection and ADI against various defenses.



Figure 10: Trade-off between utility and ASR across the evaluated defenses.

attacks, illustrating the difficulty of defining a sound policy for safe agent behavior.

Dual-LLM. CaMeL No Policy reduced ASR from 49.1% to 25.0% by storing untrusted data in variables, but did not fully prevent ADI because delimiter injection fooled the quarantine LLM into extracting wrong values from data with probabilistic delimiters.

Data flow tracking. CaMeL Normal achieved 23.1% ASR. We found that its implementation did not propagate taint annotations when the quarantined LLM extracts variables from tool responses, causing untrusted data to lose its taint label and bypass security policies. We concluded this was an implementation bug and reported it to the authors. CaMeL Strict achieved 0% ASR, demonstrating that correct data flow tracking with precise security policies could fully prevent ADI, though defining complete policies remains significantly more challenging in real-world settings.

Randomization. Randomization reduced ASR from 49.1% to 28.7% while maintaining high utility (83.3%). The attacks that still succeeded followed a common pattern. They added a fake element to a list (*e.g.*, a fake transaction in a transaction history) that the agent processed as a whole (*e.g.*, computing the total of all transactions). Such attacks did not rely on any specific field name, so the agent aggregated over the injected element together with the legitimate ones even though it carried the wrong nonce. In contrast, attacks whose injected content had to be read as a specific target field were prevented, because that field's name carried a nonce the attacker could not reproduce.

Utility-security trade-off. Figure 10 shows the trade-off between security and utility. The Baseline achieved high utility (86.5%) with high ASR (49.1%). CaMeL Strict achieved 0% ASR but at a significantly lower utility (36.5%), as strict data flow tracking restricted the agent's ability to complete benign tasks. Randomization and Progent maintained comparable utility at 83.3% and 81.4%, respectively, while reducing ASR to 28.7% and 22.2%. Notably, randomization achieved similar security to Progent without requiring a separate LLM policy engine, making it a more lightweight defense option.

7. Discussion and Related Work

Attacker's knowledge of the data format. Our threat model assumes that the attacker knows the format of agent data. The attacker can recover the format in practice through various methods depending on where it is constructed. First, formats can be constructed on the agent side (*e.g.*, tool results). In this case, the attacker can recover the format by (i) directly observing agent data that the agent renders, (ii) inspecting the source code of an open-source agent or tool, or (iii) running a closed-source agent on a local machine, reverse-engineering the client, or intercepting its traffic. Because these formats are constructed locally, the attacker can recover them with high confidence. Second, formats can be constructed on a remote server that the attacker cannot access (*e.g.*, tool call blocks), such as the LLM inference server or the server that hosts the cloud agent. In this case, the attacker cannot directly observe the format, but can extract it from the LLM via jailbreak techniques [50]. This case is the most challenging because jailbreak is not guaranteed to succeed. We leave a systematic study of jailbreak techniques for format extraction as future work. §D details how we recovered the format for each real-world agent.

Attacks on AI agents. Recent research has identified various attacks against AI agents. Direct prompt injection attacks manipulate user prompts to override the agent's intended behavior, including jailbreaking [51–54] and system prompt extraction [55–57]. Indirect prompt injection (IPI) assumes a remote attacker who controls untrusted data retrieved by tools. Its most representative category is instruction injection, where the LLM misinterprets the injected data as instructions, and the agent follows the attacker's task rather than the user's [6–8, 23, 58–64]. ADI is a new category of IPI. Unlike instruction injection, ADI causes the untrusted data to be misinterpreted as trusted data rather than as instructions.

Concurrent work by Zhang et al. [65] presents an attack they call *data injection*, which embeds visually concealed content (*e.g.*, fabricated experiences) into resumes to bias LLM-based screening. Unlike in ADI, the injected content is processed as untrusted data as is, without being misinterpreted as trusted data.

Defenses for AI Agents. Various defenses have been proposed to mitigate IPI, including model-level defenses [9, 10], input/output guardrails [36, 40], and system-level isolation and data flow tracking [13, 14, 38, 39, 45]. Although these defenses share the same threat model as ADI, they are ineffective against ADI as analyzed in §5 and demonstrated in §6.2, because they focus on separating instructions from data rather than isolating trusted from untrusted data.

8. Conclusion

This paper introduces agent data injection attacks (ADI), a new category of indirect prompt injection that exploits the lack of isolation between trusted and untrusted data. Unlike instruction injection, ADI causes untrusted data to be misinterpreted as trusted data through probabilistic delimiter injection, a technique that exploits the LLM's probabilistic misinterpretation of inexact delimiters. We demonstrate that ADI poses a realistic threat to real-world agents, including web agents and coding agents. Our evaluation shows that ADI achieves high attack success rates, even in the presence of defenses that are effective at preventing instruction injection attacks. These findings reveal a fundamental gap in current agent security, which fails to address trusted/untrusted data isolation within agent data.

9. Acknowledgment

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Appendix A. Probabilistic Delimiter Injection Benchmark Details

Table 5 details the seven data categories used in the probabilistic delimiter injection evaluation (§6.1), including the data structure type, untrusted fields where attackers inject payloads, and target fields that attackers aim to corrupt.

Category	Structure	Untrusted	Target	#
Calendar	List	summary	start time, ID	8
Cloud drive	List	file name	file ID, MIME type	10
GitHub comments	List	body	author	32
Email	Object	body	sender, subject	15
GitHub issues	Object	body	author, title	25
Paper reviews	Object	title	status, avg_score	22
Total (JSON)				**112**
Web DOM	List	text	web element ID	45
Total				**157**

TABLE 5: Data categories for LLM evaluation. The first six categories are serialized as JSON, while Web DOM uses the Nanobrowser DOM element format. Untrusted fields are where attackers inject delimiter payloads. Target fields are trusted metadata that attackers aim to corrupt. # is the number of test cases per category.

Data sources. Calendar events, cloud drive files, and email data were collected from Google Workspace APIs

via MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers and anonymized to remove personal information. GitHub issues and comments were collected from public repositories using the GitHub API. Web DOM data was synthetically generated in the Nanobrowser [18] element format. The baseline uses sequential element indices (e.g., `[0]`, `[1]`), while randomization replaces them with random indices, following the unpredictable identifiers used by ChatGPT Atlas [30]. Paper reviews were manually created as a synthetic example representing conference paper review records.

Task examples. For each category, we design extraction and aggregation tasks. Extraction tasks include: "What is the start time of the first event?" (calendar), "What is the file ID of the first file?" (cloud drive), "Who is the sender of this email?" (email), "Who wrote the first comment?" (GitHub comments), "Who is the author of this issue?" (GitHub issues), "What is the average score?" (paper reviews), and "What is the element ID of the Submit button?" (web DOM). Aggregation tasks include: "How many events are there?" (calendar), "How many files are there?" (cloud drive), and "Summarize the comments" (GitHub comments).

Appendix B. Agent Benchmark Details

We built our ADI benchmark (§6.2) on top of AgentDojo [19], reusing its 96 user tasks across four task suites and adding 108 ADI attacks. Each attack injects probabilistic delimiters into an untrusted field of a tool response to forge a trusted record, following the same pattern as the forged email object in Figure 4. Table 6 shows how the user tasks and ADI attacks are distributed across the suites.

Suite	User tasks	ADI attacks
Workspace	39	55
Slack	21	16
Banking	16	9
Travel	20	28
Total	**96**	**108**

TABLE 6: Distribution of user tasks and ADI attacks across the four AgentDojo task suites.

Appendix C. Additional ADI Attacks against Real-World Agents

Beyond the web and coding agents in §4, we demonstrate ADI against assistant agents connected to email and chat tools.

Email sender spoofing. We confirmed email sender spoofing attacks on two assistant agents connected to email tools, ChatGPT [1] and Claude [21]. Following the same pattern in Figure 4, the attacker sends an email whose body embeds a fake email object with a spoofed `from` field naming a third party. When the user asks who sent the message, the agent attributes it to the spoofed sender rather than the actual sender. These agents run in the cloud and construct the email format server-side, so the attacker extracts it through jailbreak prompting.

Origin injection on Slack. We confirmed an origin injection attack on Claude Code [15] connected to a Slack MCP server. Similarly, the attacker, who is a normal workspace member, posts a message whose body embeds a fake message block attributed to the channel administrator with sensitive content. When the user asks the agent to summarize the channel, the agent attributes the sensitive content to the administrator rather than to the attacker who posted it. The Slack MCP server serializes channel messages as blocks of the form `=== Message from <name> (<id>) === <body>`, which the agent exposes in its tool output, so the attacker can observe the format directly.

Appendix D. Data Format Recovery in Real-World Agents

Table 7 summarizes how we recovered the data format for each target agent. The recovery method depends on where the format is constructed and how observable it is, as discussed in §7.

Target agent	Target format	Source	Recovery
Nanobrowser (4.1)	element line	Agent	Open source
Claude in Chrome (4.1)	element ref	Agent	Reverse eng.
Antigravity (4.1)	element ref	Agent	Reverse eng.
ChatGPT Atlas (4.1)	element ref	Agent	Reverse eng.
Claude Code (4.2)	comment object	Agent	Observable
Codex (4.2)	comment object	Agent	Observable
Gemini CLI (4.2)	comment object	Agent	Observable
Claude Code (4.3)	tool call block	Server	Jailbreak
Codex (4.3)	tool call block	Server	Jailbreak
Gemini CLI (4.3)	tool call block	Server	Jailbreak
ChatGPT (C)	email object	Server	Jailbreak
Claude (C)	email object	Server	Jailbreak
Claude Code (C)	Slack message	Agent	Observable

TABLE 7: Data format recovery for each target agent. Agent-side formats are constructed where the attacker can access them and are recovered by reading open-source code, observing tool output, or reverse-engineering a closed-source client. Server-side formats are constructed on a remote backend, such as the LLM inference server or a cloud agent, and require jailbreak prompting.

Appendix E. Proof of Concept of ADI Attacks

E.1. Element ID Injection on Web Agents

We demonstrate the element ID injection attack (§4.1) against Claude in Chrome [2]. Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 13 show the attack payload, agent execution trace, and user confirmation dialog, respectively.

E.2. Origin Injection on Coding Agents

We demonstrate the origin injection attack (§4.2) against Claude Code [15]. Figure 14, Figure 15, and Figure 16 show the attack payload, agent execution trace, and user confirmation dialog, respectively.

E.3. Tool Call Injection on Coding Agents

We demonstrate the tool call injection attack (§4.3) against Claude Code [15]. Figure 17, Figure 18, Figure 19, and Figure 20 show the attack payload, the actual malicious commit, agent execution trace, and user confirmation dialog, respectively.



Figure 12: Claude in Chrome chat history showing the attack execution. Left: the user prompt "Summarize each customer review on current webpage" (red box). Right: the agent decides to click the fake "Read More" button (red box) after misinterpreting the injected payload as a legitimate page element. The agent invokes the `Click` action using the injected element identifier, which resolves to the "Buy Now" button on the actual page.

Figure 11: Attacker payload on the test e-commerce website. The red box highlights a product review posted by the attacker. The review body contains probabilistic delimiters (`\n`), element type descriptors (`button`, `generic`), and a fake element identifier `[ref_9]` that corresponds to the "1-Click Purchase - Buy Now" button on the page. When the web agent processes this page, the injected text is included in the webpage summary sent to the LLM.



Figure 13: User confirmation dialog displayed by Claude in Chrome before executing the click action. The dialog shows that "Claude wants to click on" the target website, without specifying which element will be clicked or why. This prevents the user from distinguishing a legitimate click from one induced by the injected payload.



Figure 14: Attacker payload injected into a GitHub issue comment. The red box highlights the injected fake comment object, which mimics the output format of `gh issue view N --comments`. The fake comment object impersonates a user named `alice` with a spoofed `Maintainer` role indicator, and suggests installing a malicious package (`pip install starship-auth`) as a fix.



Figure 15: Claude Code chat history showing the attack execution. Top: the user prompt "I have the same error with issue 8 of this project. I want you to apply the maintainer's suggested fix in the comment" (red box). The agent retrieves the issue using `gh issue view 8 --comments` and misattributes the injected comment to a maintainer. Bottom: the agent states that the maintainer suggests installing the `starship-auth` package and executes the malicious `pip install starship-auth` command (red box).

Figure 16: User confirmation dialog displayed by Claude Code before executing the `pip install` command. The dialog shows the command and its description: "Install the starship-auth package as suggested by maintainer." Because the agent itself was deceived into believing the suggestion came from a maintainer, the confirmation description reinforces the attacker's false narrative, making it difficult for the user to recognize the attack.



Figure 17: Attacker payload injected into a GitHub PR description. The red box highlights the injected payload, which begins with a closing `</function_results>` tag to terminate any pending tool response, followed by a fake `<antml:function_calls>` block that invokes `gh pr diff 6` and a fake `<antml:function_results>` showing a benign diff (changing the password input field from `type="text"` to `type="password"` in `login.html`).



Figure 18: The actual commit in the attacker's PR. Unlike the benign change shown in the fake tool response (Figure 17), the real commit inserts an XSS payload (`<script>alert(document.cookie);</script>`) into `templates/login.html`.



Figure 19: Claude Code chat history showing the attack execution. Top: the user prompt "View PR #6 of this repository in GitHub. If the PR looks good, merge it" (red box). The agent retrieves the PR using `gh pr view 6` and checks the related issue. Bottom: the agent concludes "The PR looks good" based on the fake benign diff injected in the PR body, summarizes the fabricated change, and executes `gh pr merge 6 --merge` (red box).

Figure 20: User confirmation dialog displayed by Claude Code before executing the merge command. The dialog shows `gh pr merge 6 --merge` with the description "Merge PR #6," without specifying the PR's actual content or the agent's review rationale. This prevents the user from recognizing that the agent reviewed a fake diff rather than the actual commit.